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Republicans Only Need Apply: Patronage Hiring
and the First Amendment in Avery v. Jennings
Deborah Avery, an unemployed secretary, filed a job appli-
cation with the Hamilton County Employee Services Office for
a clerical or secretarial position.1 The Republican Hamilton
County officials who headed the departments in which Avery
sought employment, however, rarely used the Employee Serv-
ices Office to fill vacancies;2 instead, the county officials se-
lected new employees through the recommendations of current
employees and Republican allies.3 As a result of this informal
hiring practice, these county officials had hired a disproportion-
ate number of Republicans. 4 Avery, who considered herself a
1. Avery also unsuccessfully tried to introduce herself to the defendants
Robert Jennings, Hamilton County Clerk of the Court, John Held, Hamilton
County Recorder, and Joseph DeCourcy, Jr., Hamilton County Auditor. Av-
ery v. Jennings, 604 F. Supp. 1356, 1357 (S.D. Ohio 1985), qbJd; 786 F.2d 233
(6th Cir.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 3276 (1986). These three locally elected offi-
cials headed the departments in which Avery sought employment. Id.
2. Held did not use the Employee Services Office, but Jennings and
DeCourcy sometimes used the referral service as a last resort. Id at 1358-59.
3. The Sixth Circuit noted that the following excerpt from Avery's brief
described fairly the Hamilton County officials' hiring practice:
The way the hiring system works is best demonstrated by examples of
those recently hired. From January 1, 1983, to October 6, 1983, Robert
Jennings hired 20 people. Steven Crawford was hired on the recom-
mendation of Adeline Womack the court reporter to the Republican
Judge, Norbert Nadel. Susan Horn was hired at the suggestion of her
father who is Jennings' Supervisor in the Automobile Title Depart-
ment. Ms. Horn is a Republican. Steven Kirschner, son of Leonard
Kirschner, the Chief Assistant of the Appellate Division of the
County Prosecutor's Office, was another hired. Jill Leis, daughter of
Judge Simon Leis, was hired. Judge Leis is a Republican. Patrick
Maloney, son of the former State Senator and present County Admin-
istrator, a Republican, was hired. One James Nichols, a manager of a
night club where the Republican 9th Ward Club held meetings was
the next employee.... Kelley Raabe was hired on the recommenda-
tion of her mother who works for Jennings in the Automobile Title
Department.
786 F.2d at 234 n.1.
Each of the defendants testified that they followed "no firm rule or policy
forbidding the hiring of Democrats." Id- at 234-35. All of the defendants, how-
ever, indicated a preference for Republicans. Id- at 235. Further, defendant
Jennings assumed that "most people who refer applicants to him refer Repub-
lican[s]." 604 F. Supp. at 1359.
4. Defendants filled vacancies almost exclusively with Republicans.
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Democrat, attempted to secure employment by contacting vari-
ous party officials, including Republican Ward Chairman Hank
Zureick.5 Although Zureick did not have hiring authority, he
often recommended persons for employment.6 Zureick assured
Avery that she need not be Republican to obtain a job, but he
added that when jobs became available, a fellow Republican
might be able to help her out if she were affiliated "in some
way" with the Republican Party.7
Following this conversation, Avery brought a class action
suit8 against Republican Hamilton County officials Robert Jen-
nings, Clerk of the Court, Joseph DeCourcy, Jr., County Audi-
From January 1, 1976 through October 1983, Jennings hired 210 applicants, 2
were Democrats; Held hired 62 applicants, 5 were Democrats; and DeCourcy
hired 160 applicants, 3 were Democrats. 786 F.2d at 235.
5. Zureick told Avery that he was not the ward chairman for her area
and referred her to Mr. James Gibson. 604 F. Supp. at 1358. When Avery
spoke to Gibson, he told her that no job openings were available. Id.
6. Id
7. Id. After speaking to Zureick and Gibson, Avery sent letters to Jen-
nings, Held, and DeCourcy. Id "The letter requested an interview and accom-
panied a resume showing that . . . she had both clerical and secretarial
experience, and that she had an associates degree in secretarial studies." Id.
All three county officials stated that they did not see the letter until after suit
was filed. Id at 1359.
8. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (which allows large groups, as representa-
tives of a class, to sue without having to join every member of the class). A
court will certify a class whenever the action meets the requirements of 23(a)
and either 23(b)(1), (2) or (3). FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b).
Rule 23(b)(1) permits a class action (a) when the prosecution of sepa-
rate actions might result in inconsistent or varying adjudications that
would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party op-
posing the class, or (b) when individual litigation might result in judg-
ments that would be dispositive of the interests of the other members
of the class who are not parties to those individual actions....
... Rule 23(b)(2) [permits a class action] when (1) the party op-
posing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally ap-
plicable to the class as a whole, and (2) the class representatives are
seeking final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief. It
is this category of Rule 23 that is used most often for... constitu-
tional litigation .... Rule 23(b)(2) will be met if the class opponent
either has acted in a consistent manner towards the class members so
that it amounts to a pattern of activity, or the party has imposed a
regulatory scheme that affects all members of the class....
... [Rule 23(b)(3) permits a class action when] ... : (1) common
questions of law or fact ... predominate over questions that only af-
fect individual class members, (2) the class action procedure [is] supe-
rior to other means of adjudicating the controversy, and (3) the best
notice practicable [is] given to the class members of the institution of
the action and of their right to exclude themselves from the class.
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tor, and John Held, County Recorder.9 Avery asserted that
these elected officials violated her first amendment rights of as-
sociation and belief' ° by using a hiring practice that precluded
consideration of her job application." The defendants acknowl-
edged that they did not consider Avery's application, but noted
that no job vacancies were filled during the time Avery sought
employment.' 2
The United States District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio granted summary judgment for the defendants.' 3 With-
out deciding whether to certify the class,' 4 the district court
J. FRIEDENTHAI, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 16.2, at 732-34
(1985) (footnotes omitted).
For further discussion concerning the significance of the case as a class ac-
tion, see infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
9. Republicans Jennings, Held, and DeCourcy were locally elected
county officials. 786 F.2d at 234.
10. See 604 F. Supp. at 1362. The first amendment provides that "Con-
gress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble." U.S. CONST. amend. I, cls. 2-
3. Although the rights of association and belief are not explicitly mentioned in
the United States Constitution, they are part of "the core of those activities
protected by the First Amendment." Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976)
(plurality opinion); see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960) (holding
that the right of association "lies at the foundation of free society").
Avery also alleged that her fourteenth amendment equal protection rights
were violated but she did not "argue" equal protection in her "pleadings." 604
F. Supp. at 1364.
11. See supra note 3.
12. 604 F. Supp. at 1359. In addition, the county had laid off four clerical
workers during this time. "[Tihe laid-off employees would have been consid-
ered first for any openings that might have occurred in any county office." Id.
This raises the question whether Avery's claim was ripe. Within 10
months from the date the suit was filed, however, Jennings had filled 20 va-
cancies, Held had filled 15, and DeCourcy had filled 10. Brief of Plaintiffs-Ap-
pellants at 9, Avery v. Jennings, 786 F.2d 233 (6th Cir.) (No. 85-3075), cert
denied, 106 S. Ct. 3276 (1986). Neither the district court nor the appellate
court discussed the ripeness issue. This Comment assumes that Avery's claim
was ripe.
13. 604 F. Supp. 1356. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (summary judgment ap-
propriate where all disputes involving material facts have been resolved). The
parties in Avery agreed that all factual disputes had been settled. 604 F. Supp.
at 1359-60.
14. The district court granted summary judgment without certifying the
class. 604 F. Supp. at 1365 n.3. The court has the power to decide on the mer-
its prior to class certification. Marx v. Centran Corp., 747 F.2d 1536, 1552 (6th
Cir. 1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985). If, however, summary judgment
is granted before the class is certified, the decision is not res judicata as to the
absent class members. 7B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 1798, at 433-34 (2d ed. 1986).
Avery probably had standing to bring a class action as the representative
of all Democrats who had applied but were not considered for employment by
1376 [Vol. 71:1374
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ruled that Avery had failed to demonstrate that her political af-
filiation was a motivating factor in the hiring process.15 In Av-
ery v. Jennings,6 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed,' 7 but for different reasons.' 8 Using a
minimal scrutiny standard, 19 the Sixth Circuit held that the in-
cidental burden on Avery's rights did "not rise to the level of a
constitutional deprivation."20
Avery's claim that patronage 2' hiring violates the Constitu-
the county officials' offices under Rule 23(b)(2) (and perhaps under 23(b)(3)).
See supra note 8. Although the court can decide on the merits before certify-
ing the class, it is inappropriate for the court to weigh the strength of the
class's claim in deciding whether a class action is proper. 7B C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & M. KANE, supra, § 1785, at 125-26. Thus, if the requirements of
Rule 23 are met, a class is certifiable regardless whether the plaintiff repre-
senting the class loses on the merits.
15. 604 F. Supp. at 1364. Avery advanced two arguments. First, she con-
tended that the county officials' hiring practice imposed an unconstitutional
condition on the receipt of a job benefit. Id. at 1360. Second, she argued that
the United States Supreme Court decisions in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
351, 372-73 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Cook County sheriffs'
practice of dismissing noncivil service, nonpolicymaking employees based
solely on political affiliation violated the first and fourteenth amendments)
and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1980) (holding that plaintiff need
not prove coercion when the dismissal is based solely on political affiliation
and that patronage dismissals are permissible only if political affiliation is nec-
essary "for the effective performance of the public office involved") are appli-
cable to patronage hiring. 604 F. Supp. at 1362. The district court held,
however, that Elrod and Brant controlled only patronage dismissals, not pa-
tronage hiring. I& See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. Further, the
court noted that not all conditions placed on employment are unconstitutional;
rather, courts must balance competing interests. 604 F. Supp. at 1360. Instead
of balancing, however, the court relied on the "mixed-motive" causation test
set out in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977) (holding that an employment decision motivated by an unconstitutional
consideration is not remediable if the same decision would have been made for
other reasons) to dispose of Avery's claim. 604 F. Supp. at 1362-64.
16. 786 F.2d 233 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 3276 (1986).
17. Summary judgments are reviewed in the light most favorable to the
petitioner. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 347-48 n.11 (1976); Avery, 786 F.2d at
235-36.
18. The Sixth Circuit summarized the decision below without criticism,
786 F.2d at 235, but went on to apply a different analysis. See id. at 236-37.
19. The Sixth Circuit's standard is vague. The court purported to balance
the first amendment harm against the governmental interest. I& at 237. It is
not clear, however, whether the court applied a balancing test or a rational ba-
sis standard. See infra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
20. 786 F.2d at 236. See infra notes 74-77 and accompahying text.
21. For a discussion of political patronage, see generally D. ROSENBLOOM,
FEDERAL SERVICE AND THE CONSTITUTION (1971); F. SORAUF, PARTY POLITICS
IN AMERICA (1968); M. TOLCHI & S. TOLCHMN, To THE VICTOR (1971); see also
Schoen, Politics, Patronage, and the Constitution, 3 IND. LEGAL F. 35 (1969)
(discussing the constitutionality of political patronage).
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tion raises a number of issues that courts have not adequately
addressed. Although the United States Supreme Court has de-
cided that patronage firing based solely on political affiliation
is unconstitutional, 22 the Court has not considered the constitu-
tionality of patronage hiring. Moreover, Avery is the first case
to consider the constitutionality of an informal hiring practice
that, while disproportionately favoring members of a political
party, does not overtly consider political affiliation.23
22. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1980) (holding that plaintiff
need not prove coercion when dismissal is based solely on political affiliation
and that patronage dismissals are only permissible if "political affiliation is
necessary for the effective performance of the public office involved"); Elrod
v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 351, 372-73 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding that the
Cook County sheriff's practice of dismissing noncivil service, nonpolicymaking
employees solely because they were not affiliated with the sheriff's party vio-
lated the first and fourteenth amendments). See infra notes 27-38 and accom-
panying text.
23. The Sixth Circuit noted that Avery's claim was novel. 786 F.2d at 234.
At least four courts recently have addressed the issue of patronage hiring. See
Messer v. Curci, 806 F.2d 667, 668-69 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that Elrod and
Brant are applicable to patronage hiring based solely on political affiliation);
Rutan v. Republican Party, 641 F. Supp. 249, 252-53 (C.D. Ill. 1986) (holding
that Elrod and Branti do not apply to patronage hiring); Indiana State Em-
ployees Ass'n v. Indiana Republican State Cent. Comm., 630 F. Supp. 1194,
1196 (S.D. Ind. 1986) (holding that "refusal to hire someone based on political
beliefs can chill a person's First Amendment rights as easily as firing someone
for political reasons"); Torres v. Grunkmeyer, 601 F. Supp. 1043, 1047 (D. Wyo.
1985) (holding that patronage hiring based solely on political affiliation vio-
lates the Constitution). Each of these cases, however, concerned the "content-
based" issue whether hiring based solely on political affiliation is constitu-
tional. Avery, by contrast, presented the "content-neutral" issue whether an
informal hiring network that disproportionately favors one political party over
another violates the Constitution. See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying
text.
Other courts and commentators have speculated on first amendment pro-
tection in the hiring context. Justice Powell, in his dissent in Elrod, suggested
that a first amendment claim may be more significant when the issue involves
patronage hiring, rather than dismissals. 427 U.S. at 381 n.4 (Powell, J., dis-
senting). Justice Powell also indicated that one can construe the Branti deci-
sion to include patronage hiring. Branti, 445 U.S. at 522 n.2 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Similarly, various federal courts have assumed, in dicta, that the
first amendment protects hiring as well as firing. See, e.g., Mazus v. Depart-
ment of Transp., 629 F.2d 870, 873 (3d Cir. 1980) (implying that there may be a
first amendment violation where there is evidence that a job was conditioned
on the surrender of political rights or the right of association), cert denied 449
U.S. 1126 (1981); Resenthal v. Rizzo, 555 F.2d 390, 392 (3d Cir.) (holding that a
state may not condition hiring or discharge in a way that impinges on an em-
ployee's right of political association), cert denied, 434 U.S. 892 (1977);
Shakman v. Democratic Org., 481 F. Supp. 1315, 1327 & n.8, 1328 (N.D. Ill.
1979) (implying that the rationale of Elrod extends to the hiring context); Mc-
Kenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 (D.N.J. 1978) (noting that just as the
government cannot directly bar the exercise of protected freedoms, "so too it
1378 [Vol. 71:1374
PATRONAGE HIRING
In an effort to identify the constitutional standards courts
should apply to patronage hiring practices, this Comment criti-
cally examines the different standards the district court and
the Sixth Circuit used to reject Avery's claim. Part I reviews
the standards used in patronage dismissal cases. Part II de-
scribes the different standards under which the district court
and the Sixth Circuit in Avery considered the constitutionality
of patronage hiring. Part III analyzes the approaches adopted
by the district and appellate courts and rejects them as inappro-
priate for Avery's claim. Part IV proposes that the Sixth Cir-
cuit should have applied a first amendment content-neutral
standard to Avery's case. This Comment concludes that, under
a content-neutral analysis, the Hamilton County officials' hir-
ing practice is unconstitutional.
I. PATRONAGE DISMISSAL CASES
Courts have considered patronage dismissals based solely
on an individual's political affiliation and patronage dismissals
involving mixed motives.25 The United States Supreme Court
also has implied that facially neutral firing decisions that dis-
proportionately affect a political group are challengeable as un-
constitutional patronage dismissals.26 Each of these situations
calls for different standards of review.
A. PATRONAGE DISMISSALS BASED SOLELY ON POLITICAL
AFFILIATION
In Elrod v. Burns2 7 and Branti v. Finkel,28 the United
is prohibited from commanding sacrifice or abridgment of those rights as the
condition of securing public employment"); see also Schoen, supra note 21, at
63 (arguing that "[h]iring for political reasons is no different than firing for
political reasons, and both are forbidden by the Constitution"); Comment, Pa-
tronage and the First Amendment After Elrod v. Burns, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
468, 475-76, (1978) [hereinafter Comment, Patronage and the First Amend-
ment] (arguing that Elrod applies to hiring); Comment, First Amendment
Limitations on Patronage Employment Practices, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 200-
02 (1982) [hereinafter Comment, First Amendment Limitations] (arguing that
the logic of Branti extends to patronage hiring); Comment, Political Patronage
In Public Contracting, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 518, 527-28 n.58 (1984) (arguing that
"there is no reason to deny hirings protection similar to that accorded
firings").
24. See infra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
27. 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion).
28. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
1987] 1379
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States Supreme Court established a strict standard29 for re-
viewing patronage dismissals based solely on political affiliation.
In Elrod, the Court considered the validity of the Cook County,
Illinois sheriff's practice of dismissing noncivil service employ-
ees of the opposite party.30 A plurality held that patronage dis-
missals infringed on employees' freedoms of association and
belief by coercing employees to change their political affilia-
tions.3 ' The plurality also held that patronage dismissals placed
an unconstitutional condition on public employment, reasoning
that what the government cannot demand directly, it cannot
achieve indirectly through the threat of dismissal.32 Moreover,
because the patronage dismissals did not further a "vital gov-
ernment end by a means that is least restrictive of the freedom
of belief and association, '33 the plurality held that the dismis-
sals violated the Constitution.34
In Branti,35 the Supreme Court affirmed the Elrod plural-
29. Strict scrutiny requires the government to show that the "regulation
is a precisely drawn means of serving a compelling state interest." Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980). The Elrod
plurality, noting "that a significant impairment of First Amendment rights
must survive exacting scrutiny," held that
if conditioning the retention of public employment on the employee's
support of the in-party is to survive constitutional challenge, it must
further some vital government end by a means that is least restrictive
of freedom of belief and association in achieving that end, and the
benefit gained must outweigh the loss of constitutionally protected
rights.
427 U.S. at 362-63.
30. After being elected sheriff, Democrat Richard Elrod dismissed non-
civil service employees who lacked party affiliation or sponsorship. 427 U.S. at
350-51.
31. Id. at 355. In addition to restricting freedoms of association and belief,
the plurality stated that patronage skews the political system:
As government employment, state or federal, becomes more perva-
sive, the greater the dependence on it becomes, and therefore the
greater becomes the power to starve political opposition by command-
ing partisan support, financial and otherwise. Patronage thus tips the
electoral process in favor of the incumbent party, and where the prac-
tice's scope is substantial relative to the size of the electorate, the im-
pact on the process can be significant.
Id. at 356.
32. Id. at 356-60.
33. Id. at 363.
34. Id. at 372-73. For an excellent discussion of Elrod, see Comment, Pa-
tronage and the First Amendmen4 supra note 23.
35. 445 U.S. 507 (1980). The Rockland County Legislature in New York
appointed defendant Branti, who was a Democrat, to a six-year term as Rock-
land County Public Defender. Id. at 509. After assuming office, Branti exe-
cuted termination notices to the Republican plaintiffs, who were assistant
public defenders. Id. at 509-10.
[Vol. 71:13741380
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ity's holding and further held that employees need not prove
that they were coerced into changing their beliefs.36 Rather,
proof that the discharge was based solely on political affiliation
was sufficient.3 7 The Court also determined that patronage dis-
missals are permissible only if political loyalty is necessary for
the effective performance of the position in question.3 8
B. MIXED-MOTIVE PATRONAGE DISMISsALS
In addition to patronage dismissals based solely on political
affiliation, circuit courts have considered patronage dismissals
involving mixed motives.39 A mixed-motive claim arises when
a firing decision is based on political affiliation in conjunction
with other factors. 40 To determine whether political affiliation
is the "but for" cause of the firing decision, courts have used
the mixed-motive standard established by the Supreme Court
in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle.41 In Mt. Healthy, a school board refused to renew an un-
36. Id at 516-17. Branti argued that Elrod "should be read to prohibit
only dismissals resulting from an employee's failure to capitulate to political
coercion .... [S]o long as an employee is not asked to change his political affil-
iation .... he may be dismissed with impunity." Id. at 516. The Court rejected
this argument. Id. at 516-17.
37. Id at 517.
38. I& at 518. In Elrod, one of the governmental interests advanced in
favor of patronage was the need for politically loyal employees. 427 U.S. at
367. Although the plurality found this interest "inadequate to validate pa-
tronage wholesale," it held that patronage dismissals involving "policymaking"
positions were permissible. Id. The Court in Branti abandoned the poli-
cymaking/nonpolicymaking distinction:
It is ... clear that party affiliation is not necessarily relevant to
every polang ... position. The coach of a state university's
football team formulates policy, but no one could seriously claim that
Republicans make better coaches than Democrats .... On the other
hand, it is equally clear that the Governor of a State may appropri-
ately believe that the official duties of various assistants who help him
write speeches, explain his views to the press, or communicate with
the legislature cannot be performed effectively unless those persons
share his political beliefs .... In sum, the ultimate inquiry is not
whether the label "policymaker" or "confidential" fits a particular po-
sition; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demon-
strate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the
effective performance of the public office involved.
445 U.S. at 518.
39. See, e.g., Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir. 1981) (involving a
dispute regarding the motive of a dismissal), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982).
40. Id at 1167-68.
41. 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (unanimous decision). Mt. Healthy was not applica-
ble to Brant because the facts of Branti did not involve mixed motives. 445
U.S. at 512 n.6.
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tenured teacher's contract because he had used obscene ges-
tures toward students and complained to a local radio station
about a proposed dress code for teachers.4 The Court held
that, although the Constitution protected the teacher's right to
free speech, the dismissal was permissible if the Board could
prove it would have dismissed the teacher for reasons unrelated
to protected conduct.43
Under the Mt. Healthy standard, a plaintiff must demon-
strate initially that protected first amendment activity was in-
volved 44 and that the protected activity was a substantial or
motivating factor in the dismissal.45 The burden then shifts to
the employer 46 to demonstrate that it would have made the em-
ployment decision for reasons unrelated to the protected activ-
ity.4 7 The standard48 thus attempts to single out the dominant
42. 429 U.S. at 282-83.
43. 1d. at 287.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. The employer must meet this burden "by a preponderance of the evi-
dence." Id.
47. Id. Mt. Healthy demands that the employer demonstrate that the de-
cision would have been the same "even in the absence of the protected con-
duct." Id. Commentators have suggested, however, that the burden-shifting
prong of the Mt Healthy test allows employers to justify employment deci-
sions in a post hoc fashion. See Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the
Mixed-Motive Title VIIAction.: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
292, 307 n.69 (1982) (arguing that the burden is on the employer "to show that
he would have, not could have, reached the same result absent the protected
conduct"); Wolly, What Hath Mt. Healthy Wrought? 41 OHio ST. L.J. 385, 393-
94 (1980) (discussing the employer's burden to show that the employee would
have been discharged, not just other valid reasons to support the discharge de-
cision); Note, Free Speech and Impermissible Motive in the Dismissal of Pub-
lic Employees, 89 YALE L.J. 376, 387-90 (1979) (arguing that the alternative
cause defense is wholly hypothetical and defendant should be estopped from
asserting it).
48. Commentators also have characterized the Mt Healthy standard as a
"harmless error" and "but for" causation test. See generally Givhan v. West-
ern Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1979) (discussing the Mt
Healthy test); Jones v. Dodson, 727 F.2d 1329, 1335-36 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating
that the Mt Healthy "but for" test is designed to sort out mixed motives be-
hind a patronage discharge); Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1167 (7th Cir.
1981) (holding that where motive for discharge is in dispute, Mt Healthy is the
correct test), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982); Brodin, supra note 47, at 293
(discussing problems of mixed-motive discharges and the use of the Mt.
Healthy standard in Title VII cases); Raveson, Unmasking the Motives of Gov-
ernment Decisionmakers: A Subpoena For Your Thoughts?, 63 N.C.L. REV.
879, 960 (1985) (arguing that Mt Healthy inquires "whether illicit motivations
influenced the decisionmaking process, and if so, whether that influence was
harmless or decisive"); Note, Politics and the Non-Civil Service Public Em-
ployee: A Categorical Approach to First Amendment Protection, 85 COLUM. L.
1382 [Vol. 71:1374
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cause of a mixed-motive employment decision to prevent giving
a windfall to an employee who would in any event have been
dismissed.49 Under the Mt. Healthy standard, the employee is
entitled to relief only if the exercise of first amendment rights
actually caused the dismissal decision.50
C. PATRONAGE CLAIMS INVOLVING FACIALLY NEUTRAL
FIRING DECISIONS
Finally, "facially neutral" firing decisions 5 ' that dispropor-
tionately affect members of a particular political group may be
challenged as unconstitutional patronage dismissals. Although
no court has considered precisely this issue, the Elrod plurality
implied that where an employment decision is not based on
political affiliation per se, content-neutral analysis is
appropriate. 52
Content-neutral analysis applies to policy or regulatory re-
strictions that appear neutral and only incidentally infringe
upon first amendment rights.53 For example, prohibiting the
REV. 558, 565 n.55 (1985) (arguing that Mt. Healthy should be applied in dismis-
sals that involve mixed motives).
49. Mt Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285-86. But see Note, supra note 47, at 385-87
(arguing that the importance of the windfall rationale is exaggerated).
50. 429 U.S. at 285-87.
51. A "facially neutral" employment decision is one that does not overtly
consider political affiliation.
52. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 374 n.17 (1976) (plurality opinion). The
plurality rejected content-neutral analysis in Elrod, noting that the sheriff
sought to control "association and belief per se," rather than conduct. Id.
Thus, the plurality implied that content-neutral analysis is appropriate if the
employment decision is aimed at conduct rather than at political affiliation per
se.
53. Under any first amendment analysis, courts must initially determine
the degree of scrutiny the alleged infringement should receive. See, e.g., Schad
v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981) (holding that "the stan-
dard of review is determined by the nature of the right assertedly
threatened"). Government regulations aimed at the content of speech, or at
political beliefs per se, generally receive strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Police Dep't
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (noting that the "essence of... forbidden cen-
sorship is content control"). For example, a statute that only allows peaceful
labor picketing is "content-based" and would be struck unless it could survive
strict scrutiny. Id at 97-99. On the other hand, courts use a "content-neutral"
balancing test to scrutinize restrictions that appear facially neutral and only
incidentally infringe on first amendment rights. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles
v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984) (holding that the critical in-
quiries for a content-neutral regulation are whether the governmental interest
is substantial enough to justify the infringement on expression, and whether
the infringement is no greater than necessary to accomplish the governmental
purpose); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S.
640, 647-48 (1981) (holding that a content-neutral restriction is valid if it serves
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distribution of any material at a fair, except from a booth, is
facially neutral.54 Content-neutral analysis requires a court to
consider three factors: the extent to which the government ac-
tion burdens first amendment interests;5 5 the value of the gov-
ernment interest to be achieved;56 and whether this interest
a significant governmental interest and leaves open alternative channels for
communication); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (regula-
tion forbidding the destruction of draft cards upheld as furthering a substan-
tial interest which was narrowly drawn and unrelated to the suppression of
expression).
It is somewhat awkward to apply the terms "content-neutral" and "con-
tent-based" to rights of association and belief; these analyses originated in the
context of free speech. Nevertheless, the underlying justification for differen-
tiating the two and subjecting "content-based" restrictions-restrictions aimed
at speech or associational rights per se-to heightened scrutiny is applicable to
restrictions on freedoms of association and belief as well. Associational free-
dom is "closely allied to freedom of speech." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25
(1976) (per curiam) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960)). Just
as government "has no power to restrict expression because of its... content,"
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95, neither may it directly restrict associational rights with-
out advancing a compelling interest. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362-63. Accord West
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.").
For discussions of the content-based/content-neutral distinction, see Ely,
Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing
in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Farber, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment- A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727
(1980); Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme Court: The
Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 757 (1986); Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amend-
ment 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983) [hereinafter Stone, Content Regula-
tion]; Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case
of Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CFH. L. REV. 81 (1978). For a criticism of
the distinction, see Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment
Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981).
54. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648-49. The Court noted that the regulation ap-
plies "evenhandedly to all who wish to distribute and sell written materials or
to solicit funds." Id. at 649.
55. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-20, at 683 (1978)
(arguing that the degree to which communicative activity is inhibited is to be
weighed against the governmental values served by the inhibition).
56. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1985); Clark v. Com-
munity For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); United States Pos-
tal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981); Schad,
452 U.S. at 68. See also Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 53, at 190 (argu-
ing that the government's burden will vary "depending upon the extent to
which the restriction actually interferes with the opportunities for effective
communication").
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could be achieved by less restrictive means.5 7 Once the plaintiff
shows that a practice restricts first amendment rights, the gov-
ernment has the burden of justifying the infringement.58 The
degree to which the restriction must narrowly further a sub-
stantial governmental interest varies in proportion to the de-
gree of infringement.59
Patronage dismissals therefore can arise in three distinct
situations: dismissals based solely on political affiliation; dis-
missals involving mixed motives; and content-neutral dismissals
that incidentally infringe on constitutional rights. The correct
standard for determining the constitutionality of a patronage
dismissal varies with the particular factual setting. Courts ap-
ply strict scrutiny to dismissals based solely on political affilia-
tion. In mixed-motive cases, where the dismissal is based both
on political affiliation and on other reasons unrelated to pro-
tected activity, courts apply the Mt. Healthy standard to deter-
mine causation. Finally, where the firing decision is not aimed
57. See, e.g., Schad, 452 U.S. at 70 (holding that "the Court must not only
assess the substantiality of the governmental interests asserted but also deter-
mine whether those interests could be served by [a less restrictive means]");
Schaumburg v. Citizens For Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 633 (1980) (holding that
regulations must not unnecessarily interfere with first amendment rights).
A least restrictive means analysis is central to inquiries involving freedom
of association. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (holding
that "[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone" when freedoms of asso-
ciation and expression are affected); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)
(holding that even when the government's purpose is substantial, it "cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle [associational rights] when the end can
more narrowly be achieved").
Dean Ely notes an ambiguity in the least restrictive means inquiry: "[lit
could require only that there be no less restrictive alternative capable of serv-
ing the state's interest as efficiently as it is served by the regulation under at-
tack." Ely, supra note 53, at 1484-85. For a highly deferential application of a
least restrictive means analysis, see Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689. (A neutral regu-
lation is permissible so long as it "promotes a substantial government interest
that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation."). Professor Lee
argues that "the Court's analysis of whether the government should have used
less restrictive measures varies according to the effect of the content-neutral
restriction on communicative opportunities." Lee, supra note 53, at 759. See
infra note 145 and accompanying text.
58. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 53, at 190.
59. Id. Professor Stone points out that, in addition to the degree of in-
fringement, the Court has also been concerned with content-neutral regula-
tions that have had disproportionate effects on types of messages or groups of
speakers. Id. at 218-19. In these instances, the Court has imposed "especially
stringent" standards of review. Id. at 219. For an excellent discussion of the
disparate impact of various facially neutral time, place, and manner regula-
tions, see Lee, supra note 53.
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at political affiliation per se, the Elrod plurality implied that
content-neutral analysis is appropriate.
Just as patronage firing takes a variety of shapes, so too
does patronage hiring. The correct standard for a hiring chal-
lenge, therefore, depends on the facts.
II. PATRONAGE HIRING
The district court in Avery held that Elrod v. Burns60 and
Branti v. Finkel6 ' controlled only discharge cases.62 Because
Avery involved hiring and not firing, the court summarily re-
fused to apply the Supreme Court opinions.63 Instead, the
court relied on the Mt. Healthy mixed-motive test" and found
that, although the right to associate with a political party is pro-
tected conduct, Avery failed to show that such conduct was a
substantial or motivating factor in the defendants' hiring deci-
sions.65 Even if Avery had met this burden, according to the
court, the county's policy of rehiring laid-off workers first
would have caused the Hamilton County officials to ignore Av-
ery's application.66 The court thus noted that the county offi-
cials would have denied Avery employment for reasons
60. 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion).
61. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
62. 604 F. Supp. at 1362.
63. Id. The district court held that applying Elrod and Branti to the hir-
ing context would amount to "a broad and unwarranted extension of those
cases beyond their facts and precedential effect." Id.
64. The district court adopted the Mt Healthy standard as it was articu-
lated in Reichert v. Draud:
(1) The threshold question is whether the plaintiff's conduct de-
serves constitutional protection.
(2) If the court finds that an employee's conduct was protected by
the first amendment, the finder of fact must determine whether [the
action taken was] because he engaged in the protected conduct. The
employee's protected conduct must be a "substantial factor" or a "mo-
tivating factor" in the employer's decision.
(3) Once the employee meets this burden ... the burden is on the
employer to prove that the action the employee is complaining about
would have taken place absent the protected conduct.
604 F. Supp. at 1363 (quoting Reichert v. Draud, 701 F.2d 1168, 1170 (6th Cir.
1983) (quoting Hildebrand v. Board of Trustees of Mich. State Univ., 662 F.2d
439, 442-43 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 910 (1982))).
65. Id at 1364. The court held that, to meet the second prong of the Mt
Healthy test, Avery must at least have shown that the defendants knew she
was a Democrat. Id. The court, however, found that the defendants had no
knowledge of Avery's political affiliation. Id.
66. Id. The court noted that laid-off clerical workers "would have been
given the first opportunity to fill any vacancies that might have occurred." Id.
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unrelated to her protected associational rights.67
The Sixth Circuit also declined to apply Elrod and Branti
to Avery's claim.68 Unlike the district court, the Sixth Circuit
read Elrod and Branti to invalidate patronage hiring, but only
such hiring based solely on political affiliation.69 The Sixth Cir-
cuit, however, found that the Hamilton County officials' hiring
system was not based solely on political affiliation; rather, the
hiring system had multiple, legitimate purposes.70
The Sixth Circuit also rejected the Mt. Healthy standard.
Without explicit discussion,7 ' the court apparently character-
ized Avery's claim as presenting a disparate impact, rather than
67. Id.
68. 786 F.2d at 237.
69. I& at 234. See also Messer v. Curci, 610 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. Ky. 1985),
rev'd, 806 F.2d 667 (6th Cir. 1986). In Messer, the plaintiffs, who sought em-
ployment with the Kentucky Department of Parks, argued that they were not
hired because they failed to work for the governor's campaign. 806 F.2d at 668.
The district court rendered its opinion after the trial court's decision in Avery
but before the appellate court's affirmance. Id. Relying on the trial court's de-
cision in Avery, the district court in Messer dismissed the complaint and held
that Elrod and Branti do not apply to patronage hiring. 610 F. Supp. at 183-84.
The district court contended that recognizing the plaintiffs' claim "would in-
volve the federal courts in a myriad of personnel decisions... that would con-
travene the spirit of the Tenth Amendment." Id. Further, the court
envisioned that "a plethora of lawsuits by swarms of disappointed job seekers
would be the inevitable result of recognition of the cause of action asserted by
the plaintiffs." Id.
In the wake of the appellate court's decision in Avery, a three-judge cir-
cuit panel (Judge Boggs dissenting) "reluctantly" reversed the district court in
Messer, holding that Elrod and Branti apply to patronage hiring based solely
on political affiliation. 806 F.2d at 668-69. Although the court admitted that it
did not agree with the appellate court's holding in Avery "that the 'first
amendment prohibits official hiring policies based solely on political affilia-
tion,"' it nevertheless felt bound by the decision. Id. at 668. The Messer ma-
jority brushed aside the dissent's argument that the appellate court's
pronouncement in Avery was dicta, stating that it would "send mixed signals
to the bench and bar" if it failed to adhere to Avery. Id at 669. Moreover, the
court believed that intracircuit cohesion was necessary because "this important
issue [is] very likely to be raised again in other litigation." 1d.
70. Avery, 786 F.2d at 237. The court noted that
[t]here is a significant difference between a patronage system that in-
tentionally uses a strict political test as the standard for hiring or fir-
ing decisions, as in Elrod [and] Brandi... and a patronage system that
relies on family, friends and political allies for recommendations. The
former has a single end tied to political belief. The latter has multiple
purposes-finding good employees, maintaining and extending per-
sonal and political relationships, creating cooperation and harmony
among employees.
Id.
71. As noted, the appellate court summarized the decision below without
criticism, id. at 235, but applied a different method of analysis. Id. at 236-37.
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a mixed-motive, problem.72 Because the court determined that
the county officials' hiring practice burdened associational
rights only incidentally,73 the court applied a rational basis
form of minimal scrutiny.74 The incidental burden, according
to the court, was outweighed by the county's interest in main-
taining and extending the elected officials' personal and polit-
ical relationships, and in securing an effective work force.75
The Sixth Circuit held that the hiring practice did not, there-
fore, unconstitutionally infringe upon Avery's first amendment
rights.76
Thus, although the two Avery courts arrived at the same
conclusion, they did so by different avenues. The district court
held that Elrod and Branti applied only to discharge cases and
consequently relied on the Mt. Healthy mixed-motive test to
sustain the county officials' hiring practice. The Sixth Circuit,
on the other hand, read the Supreme Court cases as invalidat-
ing patronage hiring, but only when the hiring decision is based
solely on political affiliation. The appellate court therefore de-
clined to apply the decisions to the county officials' facially neu-
72. The court framed the issue as whether, "in light of Elrod and Branti,
[the defendants'] general practice of hiring those applicants who were friends
or who were referred by political allies leading to a disproportionate number
of Republican employees... unconstitutionally infringes the first amendment
rights of applicants who are not seriously considered because they are not
within this informal network." Id at 236.
Disparate impact involves "employment practices that are facially neutral
in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one
group than another." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977). But see infra note 128.
73. Avery, 786 F.2d at 236.
74. Rational basis analysis is generally applied to facially neutral regula-
tions challenged under the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause.
See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that a facially neu-
tral regulation that furthers a legitimate end is not invalid simply because it
has a disparate impact). Under rational basis analysis, the challenged regula-
tion is upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate end. Id. at 246.
75. Avery, 786 F.2d at 237. The court stated that the defendants' hiring
practice had "multiple purposes-finding good employees, maintaining and ex-
tending personal and political relationships, [and] creating cooperation and
harmony among employees." Id.
76. Id at 236. "Although the informal hiring practices ... place some bur-
den on the associational rights of prospective job applicants, that burden does
not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation." Id. The court noted that
if this type of hiring practice were found invalid, thousands of government of-
fices across the country would be affected. Id at 237. The court also suggested
that invalidating this hiring practice would be tantamount to constitutionaliz-
ing civil service. Id. But see infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text (ques-
tioning this conclusion).
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tral hiring practice and instead used minimal scrutiny to
uphold the hiring practice as constitutional.
III. EXAMINING THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
USED IN THE AVERY DECISIONS
The two distinct approaches of the Avery decisions reflect a
basic judicial uncertainty as to whether the strict dismissal
standards of Elrod 77 and Branti7 8 apply to patronage hiring
and, if so, whether they control content-neutral hiring practices
that only incidentally infringe on constitutional rights. A criti-
cal analysis of the reasoning of both decisions is therefore
needed to determine the constitutional standard applicable to
Avery's claim.
The district court's determination in Avery that Elrod and
Branti apply only to patronage firing and not to patronage hir-
ing, for example, is troublesome. The thrust of the Supreme
Court patronage decisions is that government may not control
the rights of association and belief.79 Given this rule, there is
no logical basis for distinguishing patronage hiring from pa-
tronage firing.8 0 Government can control association and belief
just as effectively with patronage hiring as with patronage fir-
ing. In either context, conditioning governmental benefits on
political factors pressures individuals to compromise beliefs. 81
Some commentators contend that the pressure to compro-
mise political beliefs in the hiring context is less than that
found in the firing context.82 Proponents of this view argue
77. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion).
78. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
79. See id. at 515-17; 427 U.S. at 372.
80. The due process distinction between expectations and vested rights is
not material where first amendment rights are concerned. See Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-06 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-20
(1958). See supra note 23 (citing supporting case law and commentary).
81. Avery was laid-off at the time she sought work with the defendants.
604 F. Supp. at 1358. The pressure on her to switch her political affiliation to
obtain a job was undoubtedly real. See infra notes 83-88 and accompanying
text. See also Comment, First Amendment Limitations, supra note 23, at 201
(arguing that "the incentive of employment is a powerful one, and the induce-
ment to suppress one's political beliefs operates almost as forcefully on the
person who seeks a position as it does on one who struggles to retain one").
See supra note 23.
82. See, e.g., Messer v. Curci, 610 F. Supp. 179, 183 (E.D. Ky. 1985), rev'd,
806 F.2d 667 (6th Cir. 1986); The Supreme Court. 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REv.
1, 195 (1976); Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Patronage Dis-
missals Not Permitted Unless Party Affiliation Relevant to Job Performance-
Branti v. Finkel, 29 U. KAN. L. REV. 286, 294 (1981).
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that the job seeker is more likely to look for another job rather
than to suppress political beliefs.8 3 This argument, however,
has two problems. First, the current employment landscape in-
dicates that getting a job is often difficult.8 4 The unemployed,
therefore, are as pressured to compromise their beliefs as those
who have a job and are in fear of losing it.85 Moreover, even
assuming that there is less pressure to compromise political be-
liefs in the hiring context, the difference is constitutionally in-
significant.8 6 The Elrod plurality noted that "[r]ights are
infringed both where the government fines a person a penny
for being a Republican and where it withholds the grant of a
penny for the same reason. 87 The district court, therefore,
erred in determining that Elrod and Branti apply only to pa-
tronage firing and not to patronage hiring.
The district court also erred in applying the Mt. Healthy
test. The Mt. Healthy test is inappropriate for Avery's case be-
cause mixed motives were not involved. Avery's rights were
not violated by overt considerations that included political affil-
iation and other factors. The county officials did not consider
political affiliation at all.88 Instead, the county officials violated
Avery's rights because their informal hiring practice dispa-
rately favored Republicans. 9
Furthermore, in relying on the Mt. Healthy doctrine, the
district court confused the issues of liability and remedy.90 Av-
ery's case appeared before the court on a summary judgment
83. See, e.g., Note, supra note 82, at 294.
84. In 1982, the unemployment rate in Hamilton County was 10.2%. BU-
REAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., COUNTY AND CrrY DATA BOOK 430
(10th ed. 1983). The unemployment rate in Ohio was 12.5%. Id- at 8, 430.
85. Recent studies indicate that "unemployment has been found to be as-
sociated with higher suicide rates and mortality due to cerebrovascular and
cardiovascular disease; higher rates of admission to mental hospitals and incar-
ceration in prisons; hypertension resulting in subsequent illness; depression,
anxiety, aggression, insomnia, loss of self-esteem; and marital problems."
Ahlburg, The Social Costs of Unemploymen in WORK, LEISURE, AND TECH-
NOLOGY 19 (R. Castle, D. Lewis & J. Mangan eds. 1986).
86. See Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668, 683 (3d Cir. 1986) (Gibbons, J., dissent-
ing) ("The constitutionally significant point is not the quantum of impact, but
rather it is the impact itself.").
87. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359-60 n.13 (1976) (plurality opinion).
88. Avery, 786 F.2d at 234-35. "Each of the defendants testified that he
had no firm rule or policy forbidding the hiring of Democrats, and that he usu-
ally did not inquire into party affiliation." Id. For a description of the hiring
practice, see supra note 3.
89. See 786 F.2d at 235. See also supra note 3.
90. See Brodin, supra note 47, at 304 (employer's "same-decision" defense
goes to liability rather than remedy); Wolly, supra note 47, at 390 (Mt Healthy
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motion. Therefore, liability was the primary issue. The Mt.
Healthy test, on the other hand, concerns remedy by asking
whether the exercise of protected conduct caused the injury.9 1
Although questions of liability and remedy are often closely
connected, the distinction is important because there may be li-
ability without remedy.92 Liability exists in the first amend-
ment context when government violates constitutional rights
by considering protected activity in making an employment de-
cision.93 Under Mt. Healthy, however, a constitutional violation
is not remediable unless it is the "but for" cause of the employ-
ment decision.9 4
The liability/remedy distinction is particularly significant
with class action suits such as Avery.9 5 Class action plaintiffs
is primarily concerned with the consequences of the defendant's decision and
the "scope of relief available to the plaintiff to remedy those consequences.").
91. See Wolly, supra note 47, at 392 n.60 ("It is the injury, not the viola-
tion itself, at which the causation test is directed.").
92. Brodin, supra note 47, at 304. Brodin also suggests that disparate im-
pact problems permit a conceptual distinction between liability and remedy.
See id. at 304 n.58.
93. See Wolly, supra note 47, at 392 (concluding that the plaintiff estab-
lishes a constitutional violation by meeting the first prong of the Mt Healthy
test); cf. Brodin, supra note 47, at 320-23 (arguing that, under Title VII, a "vio-
lation is made out at the point at which the plaintiff... establishes the opera-
tion of an unlawful motivating factor," id. at 320).
94. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977). Although the district court initially spoke of "balancing" Avery's claim
against governmental interests, see Avery, 604 F. Supp. at 1362, the court in-
stead used the M& Healthy causation test to deny Avery's claim on the merits.
Id at 1362-64. Because Avery did not meet the Mt Healthy test, the court pro-
nounced that she "failed to establish any infringement on her first amendment
rights." Id. at 1365 n.3. But see Avery, 786 F.2d at 236 (holding that "[a]lthough
the informal hiring practices in question here place some burden on the associ-
ational rights of prospective job applicants, that burden does not rise to the
level of a constitutional deprivation").
Critics of Mt Healthy have argued that a mixed-motive inquiry is inimical
to first amendment values. See Note, Rethinking Selective Enforcement In the
First Amendment Contex 84 COLUM. L. REv. 144, 149-50 (1984) (suggesting
that there is a tension between the motive test and first amendment values-
good motives are irrelevant if first amendment interests are affected); Note,
supra note 47, at 393 (The test "contravenes the policies of constraining gov-
ernmental decisionmaking within constitutional bounds.").
95. See Brodin, supra note 47, at 319-23 (discussing the liability/remedy
distinction in class action suits). As noted, the district court did not certify the
class before rendering summary judgment. See supra note 14 and accompany-
ing text.
An important consequence of the liability/remedy distinction in the class
action context concerns the award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988,
which provides in pertinent part: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title .... the court,
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generally request injunctive and declaratory class relief as well
as individual relief.9 6 Class relief may be appropriate even
when individual relief is denied.97 To obtain class relief, a
plaintiff must show that the defendant infringed on protected
rights.98 Under Mt. Healthy, a plaintiff carries this burden by
demonstrating that protected conduct motivated the decision.99
Although Mt. Healthy precludes a plaintiff from individual re-
lief if the defendant proves that the same decision would have
been made absent the protected conduct, this proof should not
enable the defendant to avoid class relief.10 0 Avery was not en-
titled to individual relief because the county officials were not
hiring at the time she filed her application. 10 ' The district
court, however, improperly ignored Avery's plea for injunctive
relief. 102
The Sixth Circuit rejected both the district court's reading
of Elrod and Branti and the lower court's use of the Mt.
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party... a reasonable attorney's fee
... ." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). A "prevailing party" is one that succeeds "on
any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit" for
which the suit was brought. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
Thus, if the plaintiff class were granted injunctive or declaratory relief, even
though the plaintiff bringing the suit was denied specific relief, the plaintiff
would be entitled to attorney's fees under § 1988.
96. Avery asked for both injunctive and individual relief. Brief of Plain-
tiffs-Appellants at 1, Avery v. Jennings, 786 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-
3075), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 3276 (1986).
97. See Brodin, supra note 47, at 323-24 (If a plaintiff could establish a vio-
lation by proving operation of an unlawful factor, plaintiff would obtain "at a
minimum a declaratory judgment, partial attorney's fees, and, if appropriate, a
prospective injunction prohibiting discriminatory decisionmaking.").
98. Id. at 323.
99. See id. at 320 (Plaintiff makes out violation by establishing "operation
of an unlawful motivating factor."); see supra notes 44-50 and accompanying
text.
100. See Brodin, supra note 47, at 320, 323 (Plaintiff who establishes that a
prohibited criterion was a motivating factor in employer's decision thereby es-
tablishes liability and, before further determination of specific compensatory
remedy, is entitled to prospective injunction to effectuate deterrence goal.).
101. Avery, 604 F. Supp. at 1359. Moreover, the county laid off four clerical
workers during the month that Avery sought employment. Id. "Mhe laid-off
employees would have been considered first for any openings that might have
occurred in any county office." Id.
102. The district court's importation of Mt Healthy seems a case of arriving
at a result, then finding precedent that will achieve the result. The court cor-
rectly recognized that Avery was not entitled to specific relief. Its use of Mt
Healthy to deny her claim on the merits, however, inappropriately foreclosed
class relief. Nevertheless, absent class members could presumably relitigate
the issue of injunctive relief. See supra notes 8 & 14.
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Healthy standard.1 3 The Sixth Circuit instead concluded that
the strict standards of Elrod and Branti control patronage hir-
ing only when the hiring is based solely on political affilia-
tion.104 Although the court gave no explanation for extending
Elrod and Branti to patronage hiring,10 5 its position, as noted
above, is sound.106 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit correctly de-
clined to apply the strict test of Elrod and Branti to the Hamil-
ton County officials' hiring practice because their informal
hiring decisions were not based solely on political affiliation.10 7
The court noted that the officials in Avery based their hiring
decisions on the recommendations of employees and political
allies, not on political affiliation per se.'08 Furthermore, the
court found that, although the Hamilton County officials' hir-
ing system disparately favored members of the incumbent's
party, 0 9  the infringement upon Avery's rights was
incidental.11 0
The Sixth Circuit correctly rejected the district court's
analysis,"' yet it adopted an equally inappropriate approach.
The Sixth Circuit's standard is unclear. At a minimum, the
first amendment requires balancing conflicting interests and as-
suring a close fit between the means and the end.'1  The Sixth
Circuit, in conclusory fashion, briefly referred to balancing the
first amendment harm against the legitimate governmental in-
terests; 13 nevertheless, it did not balance the countervailing in-
103. See supra note 72.
104. Avery, 786 F.2d at 234. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
105. The court of appeals merely stated that "although the first amend-
ment prohibits official hiring policies based solely on political affiliation, it
does not constitutionalize civil service standards or establish a hard and fast
employment rule against weighing political factors." 786 F.2d at 234. The
court's position accords with the majority of commentators. See supra note 23.
106. See supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
107. 786 F.2d at 237. The court stated that "[t]here is a significant differ-
ence between a patronage system that intentionally uses a strict political test
as the standard for hiring or firing decisions, as in Elrod [and] Branti ... and a
patronage system that relies on family, friends and political allies for recom-
mendations." Id.
108. Id. For a description of the hiring practice, see supra note 3. The dis-
tinction, however, is slim. See infra note 128.
109. 786 F.2d at 236.
110. I& at 235-36.
111. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
113. 786 F.2d at 237. "Balancing the harm sought to be remedied-the ten-
dency of present systems to prefer particular political parties in different of-
fices-against the legitimate needs of elected officials .... we conclude" the
defendants' hiring system did not violate Avery's constitutional rights. Id.
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terests. Instead, the court devoted its analysis to distinguishing
the facially neutral Hamilton County officials' hiring practice
from the intentional patronage firings in Elrod and Branti.114
Furthermore, the court failed to apply a least restrictive means
analysis." 5
Equal protection disparate impact analysis'16 may have in-
fluenced the Sixth Circuit. Courts generally subject disparate
impact problems to rational basis analysis 17 when adjudicating
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.1 18 Indeed, some of the Sixth Circuit's language resem-
bles equal protection rational basis analysis. For example, the
Sixth Circuit asserted that a court will not invalidate hiring
systems that serve legitimate ends simply because the systems
lead to disproportionate representation." 9
Although rational basis analysis would have been appropri-
ate had Avery argued that the county officials' hiring practice
violated the equal protection clause,1 20 minimal rational basis
scrutiny is inappropriate for Avery's first amendment argu-
ment. Avery alleged that the county officials' hiring system im-
The court also noted that, "[u]nder the first amendment, government actions
receive a much higher degree of scrutiny when those actions are aimed at re-
stricting the content of speech than when the burden on the protected activity
is an incidental consequence of other legitimate governmental concerns." Id
at 236.
114. Id. at 237.
115. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
117. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (A facially neutral
regulation that is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose is con-
stitutional.); supra note 75 and accompanying text.
118. The fourteenth amendment provides in part: "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
119. 786 F.2d at 237. Compare the court's statement that "[i]nvalidation of
informal hiring networks like those in the instant case because they lead to
disproportionate representation... would require abolition of the hiring sys-
tems [that serve legitimate needs] across the country," id., with the disparate
impact language in Washington v. Davis: "[W]e have not held that a law, neu-
tral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to
pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection clause simply because it may af-
fect a greater proportion of one race than of another." 426 U.S. at 242.
120. For example, in Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540
(1983), the Supreme Court considered whether denying tax exempt status to a
nonprofit organization that engaged in substantial lobbying violated the first
amendment and the equal protection components of the fifth amendment.
The Court rejected both the first amendment argument, id at 545-46, and the
equal protection argument, id at 550-51. In addressing the equal protection ar-
gument, the court applied rational basis analysis, rather than strict scrutiny,
stating that "a legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a funda-
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paired her first amendment rights of association and belief. 2 '
Her claim was therefore entitled to commensurate first amend-
ment analysis. Rational basis analysis is inappropriate for a
first amendment claim because it does not balance counter-
vailing interests, nor does it require a close relationship be-
tween the legitimate end and the means used to achieve that
end.122
Thus, it is not clear whether the Sixth Circuit applied an
incomplete first amendment analysis, or a hybrid first amend-
ment-rational basis analysis. It is clear, however, that the
court's minimal scrutiny did not adequately protect the first
amendment values in question. The court should have bal-
anced the countervailing interests and applied a least restrictive
means analysis. In short, the court should have applied a con-
tent-neutral standard.12s
IV. CONTENT-NEUTRAL ANALYSIS APPLIED
TO AVERY
Content-neutral analysis was the appropriate standard for
Avery's claim. The hiring practice in Avery appeared facially
neutral. a24 Hamilton County officials based their hiring deci-
sions on the recommendations of employees and political al-
lies' 2 5 rather than on political affiliation per se.126 As a result,
the practice disparately favored members of the county offi-
mental right does not infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict scru-
tiny." Id at 549.
When the equal protection claim involves a content-based regulation, how-
ever, strict scrutiny is employed. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99
(1972) (holding that regulations aimed at "expressive conduct within the pro-
tection of the First Amendment ... must be tailored to serve a substantial gov-
ernmental interest" (citations omitted)).
121. See 604 F. Supp. at 1362; supra note 10.
122. Cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (Under the
due process clause, a regulation "need not be in every respect logically consis-
tent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at
hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative
measure was a rational way to correct it.").
123. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text; infra notes 125-49 and
accompanying text.
124. This Comment uses the terms "content-neutral" and "facially neutral"
interchangeably. For a discussion of the term "content-neutral," see supra
notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
125. 786 F.2d at 234-35 & n.1. See supra note 3.
126. I& at 234-35. "Each of the elected officials testified that he had no
firm rule or policy forbidding the hiring of Democrats, and that he usually did
not inquire into party affiliation." Id. None of the defendants knew Avery's
political affiliation. 604 F. Supp. at 1364.
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cials' party and thus harmed Avery incidentally rather than di-
rectly.127 Under a content-neutral analysis, a court must
consider the extent to which the government action burdens
first amendment interests, the value of the government interest
to be achieved, and whether this interest could be achieved by
less restrictive means. 2 8
127. See 786 F.2d at 235-36. Notwithstanding the Sixth Circuit's suggestion
that Avery presented a disparate impact problem, the argument that the de-
sign underlying the practice was to obtain politically loyal, if not Republican,
employees is strong. All of the defendants indicated a preference for Republi-
cans. Id. at 235. Further, defendant Jennings assumed that "most people who
refer applicants to him refer Republican[s]." 604 F. Supp. at 1359; see supra
note 3. This evidence puts Avery near the border line between disparate im-
pact and disparate treatment. Moreover, precedent exists to support the argu-
ment that, where infringement on first amendment rights is inevitable, a
facially neutral restriction should be treated as if it were content-based. See
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244-45 (1936) (invalidating a tax
on newspapers that circulated more than 20,000 copies per week as having a
"direct tendency... to restrict circulation"); Lee, supra note 53, at 762, 764-65
& n.36 (arguing that "facially neutral regulations can be a guise for content
discrimination"); Note, supra note 95, at 167 n.127 (arguing that the "'inevita-
ble disparate effect test'" of Grosjean retains validity).
Categorizing informal hiring practices as disparate impact problems and,
concomitantly, applying content-neutral analysis to these types of hiring sys-
tems is, however, defensible. Courts have not been receptive to claims that pa-
tronage practices violate first amendment rights. Some courts have been
reluctant to consider first amendment challenges because of propatronage bias.
For example, the Third Circuit, in Horn v. Kean, refused to extend the
Supreme Court patronage dismissal rulings to patronage dismissals involving
independent contractors, announcing that it was "extremely hesitant to
realign radically, in the name of the Constitution, a political constellation that
has been with us since the Republic was formed." 796 F.2d 668, 677 (3d Cir.
1986). In addition, the prospect of recognizing a first amendment challenge to
patronage hiring has prompted fear that "a plethora of lawsuits by swarms of
disappointed job seekers would be the inevitable result." Messer v. Curci, 610
F. Supp. 179, 184 (E.D. Ky. 1985), rev'd, 806 F.2d 667 (6th Cir. 1986). The up-
shot is that, instead of balancing first amendment interests, courts disingenu-
ously attempt to distinguish challenges to patronage practices to avoid the
Supreme Court's dismissal decisions. Horn, 796 F.2d at 684 (Gibbons, J., dis-
senting).
Given this hostile atmosphere, it is extremely unlikely that a court would
apply strict scrutiny to an arguably neutral hiring practice, even if evidence
exists of purposeful discrimination. On the other hand, courts might be per-
suaded to subject an informal hiring practice to a less exacting content-neutral
analysis. This approach would allow courts to balance first amendment inter-
ests while giving governmental interests the benefit of the doubt. See Stone,
Content Regulation, supra note 53, at 193 (arguing that, unlike strict scrutiny,
content-neutral analysis "does not sacrifice legitimate governmental inter-
ests"). Moreover, once the court's energy is focused on competing interests
rather than on meaningless distinctions, first amendment values will receive
greater protection.
128. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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A. ASSESSING WHETHER THE COUNTY OFFICIALS' HIRING
PRACTICE BURDENS FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A patronage hiring practice infringes on first amendment
rights whenever it compromises an applicant's political be-
liefs.129 The Hamilton County officials' hiring practice clearly
infringed on Avery's first amendment rights. Because the
county officials filled vacancies through the recommendations
of employees and political allies, the officials considered only
applicants who had inside connections.130 Avery had no con-
nections with current employees.13' She was virtually fore-
closed from gaining employment from the county officials
unless she switched parties to develop connections within the
"network" of their political allies.132 Thus, the officials' hiring
practice induced Avery to compromise her political beliefs.' 33
129. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 513 (1980) (citing Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347, 355 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
130. 786 F.2d at 234-35 & n.1. See supra note 3.
131. 786 F.2d at 236. The Sixth Circuit noted that Avery was "not within
this informal network" of friends and political allies. Id.
132. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
133. Compare the infringement on Avery's rights with the content-neutral
restrictions on free exercise rights that the Supreme Court considered in
Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) and Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the Court held that South Carolina
could not deny unemployment benefits to a Sabbatarian who refused to work
on Sundays, noting that state regulation forced Sherbert
to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting
benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her
religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental
imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the
free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against [her] for her
Saturday worship.
Id- at 404.
Similarly, in Thomas, the Court held unconstitutional the denial of unem-
ployment benefits to a Jehovah's Witness who terminated his employment
when transferred to a department that fabricated turrets for tanks. The Court
stated:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon con-
duct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit
because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting sub-
stantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate
his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion may
be indirec the ikfringement upon free exercise is nonetheless
substantial.
450 U.S. at 717-18 (emphasis added). See also Hobbie v. Unemployment Ap-
peals Comm., 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987) (holding that Florida's denial of unemploy-
ment benefits to an employee who was discharged because she refused to work
on Saturdays unconstitutionally burdened the employee's free exercise rights).
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B. WEIGHING THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST
Because the county officials significantly infringed on Av-
ery's rights, the governmental interest advanced by the pa-
tronage hiring practice must be substantial.134 The Sixth
Circuit discussed two justifications for the infringement in-
volved in Avery: maintaining and extending the elected offi-
cials' personal and political relationships, and securing an
efficient work force.135 These justifications have both govern-
mental and partisan elements. Only a governmental interest,
however, outweighs a first amendment infringement.
136
The interest in maintaining and extending an elected offi-
cial's personal relationships by hiring politically loyal employ-
ees is partisan, not governmental.137 An employee's political
loyalty is a governmental interest only where party affiliation
is necessary for effective job performance. 38 In Avery's case,
however, the district court found that political loyalty was not
necessary for the effective performance of the clerical positions
for which she applied.139 The defendants' first purported gov-
ernmental interest cannot, therefore, be weighed against Av-
ery's claim.
134. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 53, at 190. See supra note 56
and accompanying text. Professor Lee argues "that measuring the substantial-
ity of the government's interest is not a critical part of" content-neutral analy-
sis. Lee, supra note 53, at 782-83. "The Court rarely tells .. .Congress that
[its] concerns are insubstantial, therefore, the balance usually will be struck in
favor of governmental interests.... [1]n general the Court merely asks if the
government's interest, standing alone, has some value and if the government's
justifications are reasonable." I&i at 783-84 (footnotes omitted).
135. 786 F.2d at 237. The court of appeals stated that the purposes of the
hiring practices included "finding good employees, maintaining and extending
personal and political relationships, [and] creating cooperation and harmony
among [the] employees." Id.
136. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 n.12 (1980) (noting that "pa-
tronage dismissals could be justified only if they advanced a governmental,
rather than partisan, interest" (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976)
(plurality opinion))).
137. Cf. Shakman v. Democratic Org., 481 F. Supp. 1315, 1353 & n.43 (N.D.
IM. 1979) (noting that when officials assert an interest in obtaining politically
loyal employees, they confuse the best interests of the government with the
best interests of the party).
Defendant Jennings stated that he "'would favor hiring qualified Republi-
cans."' Avery, 786 F.2d at 235. Defendant DeCourcy admitted that "'all
things being equal I prefer to have a Republican working for me because I as-
sume that he would be more interested.., in helping me get re-elected.'" Id.
138. Branti, 445 U.S. at 517-18. See supra note 38.
139. 604 F. Supp at 1362 n.2. The district court noted that "[t]here is no
dispute ... that the positions for which the plaintiff applied were not positions
in which political affiliation is an appropriate job qualification." Id.
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The second interest discussed by the Sixth Circuit, that of
securing an effective work force,140 is clearly governmental. 141
Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated that securing an ef-
fective work force is a substantial governmental interest.142
Even if the governmental interest underlying a questioned
practice is substantial, however, the practice is constitutional
only if it is narrowly tailored to promote that interest.143
C. APPLYING A LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS ANALYSIS
The first amendment requires not only a balancing of in-
terests, but also that a practice which infringes on protected
rights advance a governmental interest in the least restrictive
manner.14 In Avery, a less restrictive alternative was available
140. 786 F.2d at 237.
141. Branti, 445 U.S. at 517.
142. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983) (holding that the gov-
ernment has an "interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its re-
sponsibilities to the public"); cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960)
(holding that the state has a right to investigate the competence of those it
hires); Note, supra note 48, at 573 ("In recent years, as demands for govern-
ment services have outstripped the availability of government resources, gov-
ernment efficiency has become an increasingly significant goal."). But cf
Elrod, 427 U.S. at 364-67 (holding that the need for an efficient work force
does not justify patronage dismissals insofar as the goal can be achieved less
restrictively by dismissing inefficient workers for cause).
143. See supra note 57.
144. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 70 (1981)
(holding that "the Court must not only assess the substantiality of the govern-
mental interests asserted but also determine whether those interests could be
served by [a less restrictive means]"); Schaumburg v. Citizens For Better
Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 633 (1980) (holding that regulations must not unnecessarily
interfere with first amendment rights). See supra note 57 and accompanying
text.
The Burger Court's use of the least restrictive means inquiry in content-
neutral analysis has been inconsistent. Compare Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S.
641, 657 (1984) (plurality opinion) (stating that the "less-restrictive-alternative-
analysis has never been part of the inquiry into the validity of a time, place,
and manner regulation") with Schad, 452 U.S. at 70 (The Court must deter-
mine whether the asserted interest could be served by a less intrusive means.).
Factors influencing judicial imposition of a least restrictive means require-
ment include: (1) the significance of the burden on protected activity, see, e.g.,
Schad, 452 U.S. at 71, 75 (applying a least restrictive means analysis to a regu-
lation that significantly burdened protected activity); Lee, supra note 53, at 793
(arguing that "[t]he primary factor influencing the Court's analysis of less re-
strictive means is whether the restriction imposes a significant burden on ex-
pressive opportunities"); (2) the substantiality of the government's interest,
see, e.g., Time, Inc., 468 U.S. at 656-57 (plurality opinion) (declining to apply
least restrictive means analysis where the governmental interest is "compel-
ling"); and (3) the disparate impact on protected rights, see, e.g., Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r, 460 U.S. 575, 586, 591 (1983) (requir-
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to the county officials-the Hamilton County Employment
Services Office. 14 5 The Employment Services Office provided a
referral service for officials who needed to fill vacancies. 14 6
When Avery submitted her application with the Employment
Services Office, over two thousand applications were on file.
147
By relying on friends and employees for recommendations
rather than the Employment Services Office, the county offi-
cials significantly narrowed the pool of qualified applicants they
considered. If the government interest is to secure an effective
work force, the best hiring method is that which considers the
largest number of potentially qualified candidates. 148 More-
over, employee hiring through the Employment Services Office
ing a less restrictive means analysis where the regulation disparately affects
the rights of a particular group of newspaper publishers); Karst, Equality as a
Central Principle in the First Amendmen4 43 U. CH. L. REV. 20, 39 (1975) (ar-
guing that when a facially neutral law has a discriminatory effect, the court
should look closely to see if it advances governmental interests in the least re-
strictive manner).
These determinative factors mandate the application of a least restrictive
means inquiry to Avery. First, because the county officials hired "insiders,"
Avery's only realistic hope for employment was to establish a connection with
party officials by switching her party affiliation. This inducement constitutes a
significant infringement on Avery's rights. See supra notes 130-34 and accom-
panying text. Second, the governmental interest in obtaining efficient work-
ers, although substantial, is not compelling. See supra notes 135-43 and
accompanying text. Therefore, the means used to achieve this interest must
be analyzed to insure that associational rights are not unduly circumscribed.
Finally, the county officials' hiring system disparately favors Republicans. See
supra notes 3 & 73 and accompanying text. A least restrictive means analysis
is necessary to address the appearance of impropriety raised by such a starkly
disproportionate effect.
145. 604 F. Supp. at 1357-58.
146. Id. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
147. Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's First Requests For Admissions at
1, Avery v. Jennings, 604 F. Supp. 1356 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (No. C-1-83-0099),
affd, 786 F.2d 233 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 3276 (1986).
148. The county officials' hiring practice falls short of meeting even an ex-
tremely deferential application of the least restrictive means analysis. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Albertini, stated that content-
neutral regulations are not "invalid simply because there is some imaginable
alternative that might be less burdensome on speech. Instead, an incidental
burden.., is permissible... so long as the neutral regulation promotes a sub-
stantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation." 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (citations omitted). In Avery, however,
the alternative was not "imaginable"; rather, the Employment Services Office
was in place and operating. Moreover, the governmental interest in securing
an efficient work force would have been achieved more effectively absent the
informal hiring system. County officials would have had a much greater
number of qualified candidates to select from if they used the county referral
service.
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restricts first amendment rights less than the defendants' prac-
tice because applicants need not compromise their political be-
liefs. With Employment Services Office referrals, an applicant
would be considered on the merits of her qualifications, not on
the strength of her political ties to insiders.
D. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The Sixth Circuit feared that reviewing patronage hiring
practices would entangle the courts in elected officials' subjec-
tive employment decisions.149 The court also opined that
preventing patronage hiring requires constitutionalizing a civil
service system.150 The premise underlying these concerns is
that, when dealing with patronage hiring, courts must step out
of their traditional role and affirmatively fashion a rigid system
based on merit. Adhering to constitutional principles, however,
only requires courts to invalidate hiring practices that do not
comport with the first amendment. Invalidating patronage
claims would not involve the courts in government administra-
tion any more than when other types of government regula-
tions are invalidated on first amendment grounds.151
Commentators also suggest that abolishing patronage hir-
ing could have serious consequences for political parties.,52 The
importance of patronage to political parties, however, has de-
clined significantly in recent years.'53 Moreover, Elrod v.
Burns'54 and Branti v. Finkel'L55 indicate that patronage prac-
tices must conform to the Constitution, even if doing so causes
political parties some discomfort. 56
Avery alleged that Hamilton County officials infringed on
her rights of association and belief. Although there was some
evidence of illicit purpose, 157 the hiring practice appeared neu-
149. See Avery, 786 F.2d at 237.
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
152. See Comment, Patronage and the First Amendmen supra note 23, at
478 & n.97 and authorities cited therein.
153. Sorauf, Patronage and Party, 3 MDW. J. POL. SCI. 115, 118-20 (1959);
Sorauf, The Silent Revolution in Patronage, 20 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 28, 30-34
(1960).
154. 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion).
155. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
156. Professor Schoen notes that "political traditions given effect through
state action must yield when they contravene the Constitution." Schoen,
supra note 21, at 88-89. "[P]arties and politics generally must adapt to the
Constitution, not the Constitution to parties and politics." Id
157. See supra note 128.
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tral. Application of content-neutral analysis to Avery's claim
demonstrates that it should have prevailed against the elected
officials' motion for summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
Avery presents the novel issue whether a hiring system
that gives preference to members of the incumbent's party vio-
lates first amendment rights of association and belief. Both the
district court and the Sixth Circuit used inappropriate stan-
dards in disposing of the issue. The district court applied a
mixed-motive test, but mixed motives were not involved. The
Sixth Circuit viewed the issue as a disparate impact problem,
yet employed a minimal scrutiny standard that did not ade-
quately protect first amendment values. Because the hiring
practice seemed neutral, the courts should have used a content-
neutral analysis. Content-neutral analysis, when applied to Av-
ery's claim, indicates that the officials' hiring practice compro-
mised her constitutional rights. Moreover, although the state's
interest in obtaining efficient employees was substantial, it was
not furthered in the least restrictive manner. Thus the Hamil-
ton County officials' informal hiring system should have been
held unconstitutional.
Thomas A. Pantalion
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